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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CARLA K. PARKER,
Petitioner/Appellee,

:
:

CASE NO.

vs.

:

DC No. 954904494

DALE S. PARKER,

:
:
:

PRIORITY NO. 15

Respondent/Appellant.

981362 - CA

Appellant, DALE S. PARKER, hereinafter "Husband." or "Respondent", submits
the following Reply Brief:
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING A
BIFURCATION OF THE DIVORCE.
-I
It is acknowledged that a trial court may bifurcate issues, pursuant to Rule 42 of the

UtahRulesof Civil Procedure, "in iufllieraiiir otYoinctunh c ni to jvnd pit'iudice . . . ."
Therefore, it follows, that a bifurcation should not be granted where to do so would cause
prejudice to a party, not "avoid" prejudice. See Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d
716, 730 (Utah App. 1990).

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the present case, the trial court bifurcated the parties' divorce and reserved all
other issues for the time of trial. Specifically, the Order of Bifurcation did not address the
date that the marital estate was to be valued and nor did it award either party any particular
account, asset or parcel of property. However, given the fact that the Wife had control of
and use of and appreciation from eight of the nine bank accounts that the parties held and
the majority of the parcels of property that the parties held, as well as control of the marital
development projects, the bifurcated decree served to artificially divide those assets, though
the documents divorcing the parties do not make that allocation. The Husband entered an
objection to the Commissioner's recommendation because the Order of Bifurcation served
to prejudice him and he knew at the date that it was granted that it would serve to prejudice
him. His intention in preventing the bifurcation was not to prevent the parties from actually
divorcing, but was to prevent the divorce from occurring without the thoughtful division of
the marital assets and careful consideration of the rights and obligations of each of the
parties.
In the instant case, the Decree was entered and a de facto allocation of assets occurred
which de facto allocation benefited the Wife. The Husband was not allowed an equal or
equitable distribution of the marital estate, even after a 25 year marriage. There was little,
if any, premarital property brought into the marriage, however, Wife argued that a bifurcated
decree would "eliminate the risk by [Husband] that investments [Wife] has or property

2
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[Wife] acquires in the future or assets which appreciate in value should be part of the
marital estate, and therefore, subject to equitable distribution." However, under Utah law,
as there was no premarital property. Husband was entitled to an equitable interest of each
of the marital investments and the appreciation thereto, regardless of whether or not Wife
had control of them. All substantial assets that existed at the date of the bifurcated decree
existed at the date of trial, and under Utah law, those assets, whether they appreciated in
value subsequent to the bifurcation and prior to the divorce trial, were marital assets subject
to equitable distribution. Marsh v. Marsh. 361 Utah Adv. R. 12 (Jan. 22, 1999) ("[M]arital
property 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever
obtained and from whatever source derived;' " (quoting Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076,
1079 (Utah 1988) (quoting Englert v. Englert. 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978))). It is
contrary to Utah' s entire body of law concerning marital property and its equitable
distribution to allow Wife to employ a bifurcated decree as a manipulation technique to deny
Husband an equitable share of the marital estate, or the appreciation thereto. Husband
requested, but was denied, a hearing on this issue in order to provide evidence as to the
prejudice to Husband. The trial court entered the divorce, and then later established this date
as the valuation date of the marital estate.
Wife argues in her Brief that bifurcation in a divorce action "is not only permissible
but in some cases necessary to ensure that one party by simply using the legal relationship

3
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of husband and wife to gain an unfair advantage in afinalproperty and debt distribution/'
(Appellee Brief, p. 22). Indeed Husband does not disagree with this conclusion that in some
cases this is true. However, in some cases, such as this one, where one party has control
over the vast majority of the assets, a bifurcation should not be entered by the court which
would allow one party "to gain an unfair advantage in a final property and debt distribution."
It is uncontroverted that Wife requested the bifurcated decree to "eliminate the risk of
claims" by Husband to marital investments controlled by Wife, and the appreciation thereto.
Therefore, Wife seems to argue that not only should a bifurcated decree be granted to keep
one party from getting an unfair advantage in a divorce, but also that a bifurcated decree
should not be denied where it is employed to allow one party an unfair advantage in a
divorce. In sum, a bifurcation should not be employed to set the valuation date of the marital
estate where evidence as to the value and division of the estate is not taken until over a year
later. Otherwise severe prejudice will happen where one party has control of the majority
of the assets and bank accounts, as in the present case.
Wife also argues that "the trial court: correctly concluded that there was no justifiable
reason for the continuation of the legal relationship of Mr. and Mrs. Parker as husband and
wife." (Appellee Brief, p. 24). However, this argument does not consider that there was
substantial marital property which Husband had an equitable interest in which Wife had
control of and dissipated as she wished subsequent to the bifurcation. The trial court did not

4
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take evidence as to the value of the marital accounts or property or the prejudice caused to
the Husband at the time of bifurcation. Wife had complete access and control of eight of the
accounts, and the parties had joint access and control to the one remaining account.
Subsequent to the bifurcation, Wife continued to use these marital accounts as she
pleased. Husband had no access to these marital accounts. At the date of separation, the
account Husband had access to an account which consisted of $688.41 while the eight
accounts Wife controlled consisted of $134,516.49. At the date of the bifurcated divorce
decree, the balance in the accounts in control of Wife was then $36,986.74 and the balance
in Husband's account totaled $1,735.37. Therefore, the accounts in Wife's control
diminished nearly $100,000.00 during the six months between the parties' separation and
the entry of the bifurcated order. Clearly, the prejudice to the Husband is substantial and
creates a serious inequity.
After trial, the court found that "[t]here is no specific accounting of all of the bank
accounts, however, either as to the source of deposits or nature of expenditures, that will
allow the Court to accurately determine any net value of the accounts to divide the same
fairly. Therefore, the Court awards each account to the holder of the same, and makes no
valuation for purposes of the marital estate/' (R. 829). Therefore, the court did not consider
the initial depletion of $100,000 from the date of separation to the date of the bifurcated
decree, nor did the court even employ an offset for the $36,000 difference in the accounts

5
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as of the date of the bifurcated decree. In essence, the court used the date of the bifurcated
decree to create a de facto property distribution.
This bifurcated decree was not entered "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice" as prescribed by Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The bifurcation
caused prejudice to Husband. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in bifurcating
this action on April 15, 1996 and then subsequently using this date as the valuation date of
the marital estate when no actual formal division of the estate was made until over one year
later.
H.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THAT
THE DATE OF VALUATION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WOULD BE
APRIL 15. 1996. THE DATE OF THE BIFURCATED DECREE. RATHER
THAN THE DATE OF TRIAL.
Generally, the marital estate should be "valued at the time of divorce or trial."

Shepherd v. Shepherd. 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Rappleye v. Rappleye.
855 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App. 1993); Berger v. Berger. 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985);
accord Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980); Peck v. Peck. 738 P.2d
1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987). The general rule is followed except where one party has
"dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or otherwise acted obstructively." Peck. 738 P.2d at
1052; see also Shepherd. 876 P.2d at 433 (affirming the trial court's use of a date other than
the date of divorce where one party utilized portions of the marital estate for his own support

6
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and the other party had little or no access to the liquid assets of the estate during the
pendency of the action); Andersen v. Andersen. 757 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988). Contrary
to the apparent representation of Wife in her brief, there is no rule or case law which
provides for a valuation date for the marital estate when a bifurcated divorce decree is
entered. Therefore, in determining the valuation date for the marital estate, the trial court
must determine which valuation date will provide the most equitable distribution. Clearly,
the body of law that has developed in Utah regarding the valuation date for a marriage
contemplates the divorce date being the date of trial when testimony is taken, so that an
informed, intelligent and equitable decision can be made in the division of the marital estate.
Subsequent to hearing, the trial court ordered that the marital estate would be valued
as of April 15, 1996, the date the bifurcated decree was entered. However, there was no
division of the marital estate as of April 15, 1996, and there was no evidence as to what the
marital assets consisted of, what their respective value was, nor was there any temporary
division of said assets. As set forth in the statement of facts, the vast majority of these assets
were controlled by Wife at April 15, 1996. Therefore, the trial court' s decision actually
manufactured an artificial date to value the marital estate, though the estate had not been
divided at the earlier date. In so doing, the trial court divided it de facto to the prejudice of
Husband.

7
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Again, the substantial portion of the real property assets, including the most valuable
asset, which is the Murray Parkway project, and eight out of nine bank accounts were under
Wife' s control and by virtue of this, effectively awarded to her, as well as the appreciation
on these marital assets from April 15, 1996 until the trial in October of 1997. This award
occurred solely because of this artificial date of valuation and the de facto award of the asset
by virtue of the "accident" of possession of the asset at the date of the bifurcated decree.
Wife argues that xx[b]y making this decision the trial court in no way made any
distribution of the assets in question by Mr. Parker. Rather it selected a point in time
consistent with the general rule in Utah to determine what comprised the marital estate and
what the estate was worth at that particular point in time." (Appellee Brief, p. 29).
However, the trial court actually ordered that "each account [be awarded] to the holder of
the same, and makes no valuation for purposes of the marital estate/' (R. 829). Wife was
the "holder" of eight of the nine marital accounts, or 99.5% marital funds at the date of
separation and 95.5% as of the date of the bifurcated decree.1 Therefore, a de facto property
distribution was made to Wife by way of the bifurcated decree which greatly prejudiced
Husband. The same de facto division occurred with regard to the Murray Parkway property

1

Total funds in the marital accounts at the date of separation = $135,204.90; total
funds in the marital accounts at the date of the bifurcated decree = $38,722.11; amount in
accounts which Wife was the "holder" of at separation = $134,516.49; amount in accounts
which Wife was the "holder" of as of the bifurcated decree = $36,986.74.
8
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because that development was under the control of the Petitioner during the pendency of the
proceedings and subsequent to the bifurcated decree and the court reasoned in its findings
that the Petitioner's personal time spent in the development of the property over the course
of the period up to the date of the decree obviated in favor of the same being awarded to
Petitioner. Again, this resulted in a de facto award of this most substantial marital asset to
Petitioner, because of her acts and the court's granting of a motion to bifurcate and valuing
the marital estate at the date of the bifurcation.
Regardless of when the bifurcated order was entered, since the marital assets were not
divided by the court, all of the marital assets remained marital assets until the division of the
assets at the trial and by the court' s minute entry decision. Because these assets remained
marital assets until the Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered, the appreciation of
these assets is also a marital asset which should have been equitably divided by the trial
court, rather than simply being awarded to the " holder" without any further consideration.
Wife also argues that the entry of the bifurcated order and the use of this date as the
valuation date for the marital estate "was the fair way to ensure that one party was not
allowed to simply sit back and then at some unknown future point in time take advantage of
the hard work, time and effort which had been expended by the other in furthering and
bettering his/her financial position/' (Appellee Brief, p. 30). However, Husband has not
made any claim as to any of Wife' s hard work or effort made after the parties' divorce in

9
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relation to non-marital assets. The claims which he has made are concerned only with
marital assets which were completely under Wife' s control since the separation, some of
which were depreciated (bank accounts lost approximately $100,000 from date of separation
to date of bifurcation), and others which appreciated (real estate, and development property)
during this time and until the date of trial.
By virtue of the trial court using April 15, 1996 as the date of valuation of the marital
estate, the trial court effectively "divided" the estate as of that date, greatly prejudicing
Husband with regards to the parties' interest in all of the marital assets, including the marital
interest in the Murray Parkway, LLC. As of April 15, 1996, the land was still mostly
undeveloped. The pasture land value of this property was far less than its development
value. Both of the parties, the witness Martin Merrill, and the court each commented on the
speculative future value of this project. By valuing the Murray Parkway, LLC as of April
15, 1996, even though there is no dispute that it was a marital asset purchased for
developmentfromHusband's family, the Husband has been severely financially prejudiced.
The court, in the pre-trial motion, had ordered the valuation date to be April 15, 1996.
The court refused to hear evidence of the "current" value of the marital estate or assets at the
date of the parties' divorce trial. The Husband renewed his request at trial for the court to
permit evidence of the "current" value of the marital assets and the court, again, declined
to permit such evidence. The Wife cannot now claim that Husband was at fault for failing

10
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to provide evidence of value of the various assets, because the court specifically found that
all appraisals that were to be performed were to value the property as of April 15, 1996.
Husband did provide his testimony, however, regarding the future value of the Murray
Parkway project and other witnesses testified that the future value was greater than the value
of at the date of April 15, 1996 but unknown, due to the speculative nature of the
development project.
The trial court abused its discretion in using the date of April 15 1996 as the
valuation date. This defeats the purpose and reasoning of prior cases that require the
valuation date be the date of " divorce" because the divorce date is typically the date of trial
which is when the assets are actually divided and valued.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DIVIDE
THE PARTIES' INTEREST IN MURRAY PARKWAY LLC. EQUALLY
GIVEN THAT THE VALUE OF THE INTEREST WAS DIFFICULT TO
DETERMINE AND SPECULATIVE.
A property division made by the trial court will not be upheld " where to do so would

work a manifest injustice or inequity." Pusey v. Pusey. 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986)
(citing Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). In addition, property distributions will
be overturned where the trial court fails to follow the standards set by the appellate courts.
Potter v. Potter. 845 P.2d 272, 273 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d
193, 198 (Utah App. 1992); Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App. 1990)).

11
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One standard which has been established by the appellate courts is that in fairly
dividing a marital estate, if the value of a business interest or stock is disputed or varies
widely, "in order to protect the parties, and eliminate altogether the considerable problems
in determining value, the in-kind division of [the interest] [is] the proper solution/' Savage
v. Savage. 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983).
A substantial portion of the marital estate consists of a 50% interest in Murray
Parkway, LLC. The land was purchased from Husband's family with the understanding that
Husband would be a co-owner and also be the builder of the homes in the subdivision.
The subdivision, as an undeveloped property, was appraised by Mr. Webber at
approximately $32,000 per acre. However, this appraisal did not consider that this property
was in the process of becoming a developed property. According to Husband and Mr.
Merrill, the property has far greater value as a development. (R. 1023, p. 344, 11. 3-8).
However, this value is extremely difficult to accurately determine, due to it being a closely
held corporation as well as the difficulty in valuing developing land. Therefore, due to the
speculative nature of valuing closely held corporations and land developments, the marital
interest in Murray Parkway, LLC should be divided between the parties because "any cash
distribution risk[s] doing substantial injustice to one party/' Savage. 658 P.2d at 1205.
In Naranjo v. Naranjo. the trial court found that the value of the interest in stock in
a closely held corporation was "unknown." 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988). Due to the

12
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speculative and unknown value of the stock, the trial court awarded each party one-half of
the stock. Id at 1149. This Court affirmed stating that " [a]n in-kind distribution of closelyheld corporate stock is appropriate where the evidence fails to establish the stock' s value/'
111 (citing Savage, 658 P.2d at 1204-05). Further, this Court stated that "[i]t would be
inappropriate, given the speculative nature of the investment... for [one party] to receive
all of the stock and [the other party] to receive offsetting property." IdL
In the present case, the trial court found that "it is impossible to project [the] future
value" of the Murray Parkway Subdivision. (R. 830). In addition, when Husband offered
evidence as to the value of the interest in developing the Murray Parkway Subdivision, Wife
objected on the basis of the development' s speculative nature and the trial court sustained
the objections. The court states as follows:
Appellee' s Counsel: Your honor, I would again object. I believe, at this
point it would be purely speculative as to what the property might be worth
when it' s completed.
The Court: I tend to agree. I am going to sustain the objection.
(R. 1023, p. 343,11. 21-25).
The trial court valued the Murray Parkway Subdivision as undeveloped land. Only
the value of one-half of the parties' equity in the property at April 15, 1996 was divided in
the property distribution, even though both parties, witnesses for both parties, and the
findings entered by the trial court all acknowledge that the property was bought for and in

13
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the process of being developed. The 33 acres should not have been valued as undeveloped
land when, even prior to April 15, 1996, the property was already in the process of early
development. (See excerpts from Plaintiff' s Exhibit 59 Addendum " O " in Appellant
Brief).2
The supplemental findings entered on April 27, 1998 state that " although the
property is a marital asset, it is impossible to project future value . . . ." (R. 830). This is
by no means a justification for not valuing and equitably distributing a marital asset or
interest. In discussing similar difficulties with valuing retirement accounts, the Supreme
Court of Utah stated that "where no present value can be established and the parties are
unable to reach agreement, resort must be had to a form of deferred distribution based upon
fixed percentages/' Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982) (quoting
Kikkert v. Kikkert 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (N.J. 1981)); See alse Sorensen. 769 P.2d at 828
(holding that the argument that goodwill in a dental practice should not be subject to
equitable distribution because it was difficult to value was the "most unpersuasive

2

It should also be noted that the Murray Parkway project will consist
of 113 building lots. Wife did testify as to the value of one residential
building lot in South Jordan. She testified that it was worth $50,000.00, "and
that' s very conservative." (R. 1022, T. 54,11. 4-11). Therefore, assuming
that only 100 lots will be developed, at $50,000.00 per lot, that totals
$5,000,000.00.
14
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argument/7 and "the mere fact that goodwill may be difficult to value or elusive in nature,
does not justify ignoring or disregarding it altogether in the valuation of marital property/')
Each relevant witness testified that the Murray Parkway property was an investment
and that they intended to realize a profit on the property. Husband testified that he expected
that the development of the property would realize between one and two million dollars in
profit, and Wife' s witness, Mr. Merrill, testified that the project would have a much greater
value once it was developed. (R. 1023, p. 344,11. 3-8).
"Whether that resource is subject to distribution does not turn on whether the
spouse can presently use or control it, or on whether the resource can be given
a present dollar value. The essential criterion is whether a right to the benefit
or asset has accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. To the extent that
the right has so accrued it is subject to equitable distribution/' Woodward.
656 P.2d at 432-33.
Wife has claimed that the court's distribution of the Murray Parkway project to the
Petitioner was equitable because of various numbered reasons. The reasons outlined in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 (Appellee Brief, pp. 33-35) were all rebutted with testimony of
the Husband at the time of trial as set forth in the Husband's brief. The testimony was also
rebutted by a portion of the testimony of Martin Merrill. Nevertheless, even if the assertions
set forth in Appellee's brief, page 33, numbers 1 through 4 were correct, to grant the
property to the Wife based upon those articulated reasons flies in the face of Utah case law
and the holding of Woodward supra. Also, as set forth in Appellant's brief and Appellant's

15

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reply brief, the fact that the Petitioner continued to control the development and to prevent
the Husband's contribution to the project should not then, de facto, result in an award of the
asset to her. Therefore, Appellee's reason number 5 (Appellee Brief, p. 35) is not an
equitable or justifiable claim or reason for why the project should have been awarded to
Petitioner.
As set forth in Appellant's brief, Appellant stipulated to pay his share of all necessary
out-of-pocket expenses of Wife in the furtherance of the development. To that end, as set
forth in item 10, page 35, of Appellee's brief, a lawsuit was instituted but then settled by
stipulation and order, which stipulation specifically provides for 25% of the proceeds from
the sale of the project assets to be deposited into an account pending the decision by this
court and, also, specifically requires that Husband reimburse one-half of any out-of-pocket
costs incurred by wife. (That stipulation and order are attached as Addendum A) Therefore,
the arguments made by Appellee in her brief, page 35, numbers 6 and 10, are without merit.
The interest in the Murray Parkway property was acquired by the parties during the
marriage and the right to develop the property accrued "in whole or in part" during the
marriage. The right to the real estate development is certainly a right to a benefit, even if a
future benefit, which is subject to equitable distribution. As stated in Woodward, where a
present value on a future benefit is difficult to ascertain, some distribution according to fixed
percentages should be employed. Therefore, as applied to the parties' interest in the right
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to the benefit of developing the Murray Parkway property, where the trial court found that
"it is impossible to project [the] future value" of the development property, the trial court
abused its discretion by not dividing the parties' interest in this marital asset on a percentage
basis of the interest according to the standards set by the appellate courts in Savage and Lee
v. Lee. 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987). For the foregoing reasons, and based upon Utah
case law, though parties oftentimes do want to sever financial ties and while there is
oftentimes substantial animosity, particularly when a matter proceeds to trial, that does not
require a result which provides one party a windfall and prejudice to the other. Therefore,
the arguments numbered 8 and 9, on page 35, of Appellee's brief are, again, without merit.
Further, as set forth above, there was clearly no evidence presented to the court as to
what the value of the property was at the date of trial nor the future value of this valuable
marital asset. For that reason, the last articulated reason that Appellee claims the project
should have been awarded to Appellee, number 11, page 35, of Appellee's brief, is not
correct and is not supported by the evidence presented.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DIVIDE THE
PARTIES' VARIOUS BANK ACCOUNTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR THE
VALUE THEREOF. GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL MONIES INVOLVED AND
THE FACT THAT WIFE CONTROLLED NEARLY ALL OF THE MONEY IN
SAID ACCOUNTS.
"The trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do so

constitutes reversible error * unless the facts in the record are clear uncontroverted, and
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capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.' " Carlton v. Carlton. 756
P.2d 86, 87 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1983); Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). "[T]he trial court's failure to
include property valuations in divorce actions may constitute an abuse of discretion sufficient
to require remand for determination/' 14 at 88 (citing Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1074
(Utah 1985); Boyle v. Boyle. 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah App. 1987)); see. also. Munns v,
Munns. 790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that a marital property distribution
must be based on adequate findings and "[t]hese findings must place a dollar value on the
distributed assets") (emphasis added).
At separation, Wife had control of eight of the nine accounts. Husband was left with
$688.41 and Wife was left with $134,516.49. At the date of the bifurcated divorce decree,
the balance in the accounts in control of Wife was then only $36,986.74 and the balance of
Husband's account totaled $1,735.37.
In support of the Husband' s position in regards to the bank accounts, Husband's
expert witness, Robert Miller, testified that Defendant's Exhibit 7 represented the cash
balances in the respective accounts taken either directly from the accounts or as could be
imputed as best he could from the statements and records that were available. Bank
statements were also admitted into evidence showing the respective balances on the dates of
separation and divorce.
18
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In spite of expert witness testimony and the relevant bank statements evidencing the
value of these accounts at the different dates, the trial court found that:
" [tjhere is no specific accounting of all of the bank accounts, however, either
as to the source of deposits or nature of expenditures, that will allow the Court
to accurately determine any net value of the accounts to divide the same fairly.
Therefore, the Court awards each account to the holder of the same, and
makes no valuation for purposes of the marital estate." (R. 829) (emphasis
added).
Husband did offer a very specific accounting of the accounts, and Wife testified that she did
not because Husband had "already provided an accounting in his exhibits about what was
in [her] accounts." (R. 1024, p. 537,11. 14-17).
Regardless, the difficulty of the valuation of a marital asset is not an adequate
justification for the trial court to refuse to value said asset. S££ Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769
P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989) (stating that "the mere fact that goodwill may be difficult to
value or elusive in nature, does not justify ignoring or disregarding it altogether in the
valuation of marital property").
Husband presented evidence, the relevant bank statements, as well as the expert
testimony of a CPA, as to the value of the respective marital accounts at the relevant dates.
Husband submits that this evidence on this issue was "clear and uncontroverted." Wife
failed to provide evidence to the trial court as to what the balances of the accounts were,
from what sources, and where the money went. In fact, Wife testified at trial that she did not

19

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

offer any such evidence because Husband " already provided an accounting in his exhibits
about what was in [her] accounts." (R. 1024, p. 537,11. 14-17). Wife argues in her Brief the
evidence on this issue was "conflicting" and that the trial court made "specific findings
about the parties' bank accounts." (Appellee Brief, p. 42). However, neither of these
allegations excuse the trial court from considering and/or valuing the accounts, which
consisted of over $135,000 at the date of separation and over $38,000 at the date of the
bifurcated decree, with one party having control over at least 95% of these monies at all
times.
The trial court's failure to place a value on these marital assets and to simply award
them to the party who had control of them, given that Wife had control of the vast majority
of these accounts, severally prejudiced the Husband, imbalanced the division of the marital
estate, and is an abuse of discretion and reversible error. See Carlton. 756 P.2d at 89;
Munns. 790 P.2d at 119; Boyle. 735 P.2d at 671; Jones. 700 P.2d at 1074.
A.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Failing to Value the Parties' Bank
Accounts at the Date of Separation in Light of Wife' s Dissipation of the
Marital Estate.

The general rule is that the marital estate should be valued as of the entry of the
divorce decree or trial. See Berger. 713 P.2d at 697; Rappleye. 855 P.2d at 262; Peek. 738
P.2d at 1052; Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah App. 1989). "However, in the
exercise of its equitable powers, a trial court has broad discretion to use a different date, such
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as the date of separation, when circumstances warrant." Shepherd. 876 P.2d 432-33
(citing Peck, 738 P.2d at 1052) (emphasis added). "[W]here one party has dissipated an
asset, hidden its value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under its broad
discretion, value the property at an earlier date, i.e. separation." Peck, 738 P.2d at 1052
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
At separation, Wife had control of eight of these nine accounts. Husband was left
with $688.41 and Wife was left with $134,516.49. At the date of the bifurcated divorce
decree, the balance in the accounts in control of Wife was $36,986.74 and the balance of
Husband totaled $1,735.37. Therefore, the marital accounts in Wife' s control diminished
nearly $100,000.00 during the six months between the parties' separation and the entry of
the bifurcated order.

It should be noted that during this time, Wife's income was

approximately $8,333.00 per month according to a Verified Motion and Child Support
Worksheet submitted in October of 1995. (R. 9-15). Wife' s expenses were approximately
$6,606.80 per month as claimed in her Financial Declaration. (R. 164).
However, even with this surplus monthly income, Wife testified that she wrote
$35,000.00 worth of checks out to herself which she "lived off" in November of 1995. (R.
1024, p. 464-65,11. 18-25, 1-3). Another check was written out to herself on November 6,
1995 for $62,991.91 that Wife testified she used to "live on." (R. 1024, p. 466,11. 6-17).
Later, concerning this additional $63,000.00, Wife testified that:
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A. (Appellee): I don't remember what I did with it. It wouldn't - it
wouldn' t have been spent all in one place. It wouldn' t be something I' d
remember. (R. 1024, p. 467,11. 6-8).
This enormous amount of money out of the parties' marital estate was dissipated by Wife
from the date Wife filed for divorce in October of 1995 through the end of that year.
Wife's Brief is noticeably silent as to addressing where all of this marital money went.
Wife argues that "both sides gave it 'their best shot' to demonstrate that the other had
hidden or used marital assets to acquire or maintain non-marital assets." (Appellee Brief,
p. 31). However, no explanation is given as to the enormous amount of dissipation of
marital assets by Wife. It is uncontroverted that she had approximately $1,700 per month
in net income in excess of her expenses. It is also uncontroverted that she wrote
approximately $100,000 in checks, made out to herself, in November of 1995 to "live off"
of. The only explanation given by Wife as to where this money went was:
A. (Appellee): I don't remember what I did with it. It wouldn't — it wouldn't have
been spent all in one place. It wouldn't be something I' d remember. (R. 1024, p.
467,11. 6-8).
This blatant dissipation of the marital estate and "divorce planning" which Wife used
to hide all of the parties' liquid assets and leave Husband with only $602.00 required that
the trial court use the date of separation to value the marital bank accounts, or to at least
award Husband an offset to compensate Husband for Wife's dissipation of the marital estate.
See Peck 738 P.2d at 1052; Shepherd. 876 P.2d at 433.
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CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, and the reasons argued in Appellant' s Brief, Husband
requests that this Court reverse the trial court on the issues presented and order that (1)
the marital estate, with the possible exception of the parties' bank accounts, be valued at
the date of trial; (2) that due to Wife' s dissipation of the parties' bank accounts, that
these bank accounts be valued as of the date of separation, one-half to each party, which
requires an adjustment in favor of Husband in the sum of $66,914.04; and (3) that due to
the substantial and speculative nature of the value of the parties' interest in Murray
Parkway, LLC, that the parties' 50% membership interest be divided one-half to each.
Further, Husband requests his costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 j > W of June, 1999.
CORPQRON & WILLIAMS, P.C.

OAE F. WILLIAMS
attorney for Appellant

23

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT were mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following:
SHARON A. DONOVAN
Attorney for Appellee
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
310 South Main #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
DATED THIS

of June, 1999.
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Bruce J. Nelson (2380)
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Defendants Murray Parkway Associates
and Martin W. Merrill

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DALE S. PARKER,
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 970904981 CM

vs.
MURRAY PARKWAY ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Liability Company; CARLA
K. PARKER, an individual; and MARTIN
W. MERRILL, an individual,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.
The parties above-named, in full settlement of the issues of the above-entitled case,
hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
1.

Each of the parties hereto acknowledge that Murray Parkway Associates, L.C.

("Company") is a validly formed and currently existing Utah limited liability company. The
Company is a party to certain real estate purchase contracts pertaining to real property (the
"Property") located generally west of the Murray Parkway Golf Course.
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2.

Each of the foregoing parties acknowledges that Defendant Martin W. Merrill

"(Merrill") is the owner of a fifty percent (50%) interest in the Company. The remaining fifty
percent (50%) interest is owned by Defendant Carla K. Parker ("Carla") pursuant to Court
determination in the pending divorce between Dale S. Parker ("Dale") and Carla, currently filed
as Civil No. 954904494 in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. The
parties acknowledge, however, that such determination may be appealed by Dale. Accordingly,
the Carla K. Parker interest in the Company is subject to the pending legal claims asserted by
Dale in the divorce and appeal proceedings. Dale does not waive any rights or claims in that
regard by entering into this Stipulation for Settlement. The purpose of this Stipulation is to
acknowledge the undisputed ownership of Merrill and to allow the final decision on ownership of
the other fifty percent (50%) interest to be determined through the divorce proceedings and not
this action.
3.

All parties stipulate and agree, subject to any subsequent divorce court order, that

Dale is not a member, or manager of the Company. The Company is currently owned and
managed by Defendants Merrill and Carla. At the present time, such Defendants have the right
to manage the property and assets of the Company and agree to use reasonable, good-faith
judgment in dealing with such property and assets. In connection with any real property owned
by the Company, such Defendants have authority to develop the same, delay any development
efforts, mortgage, sell, joint venture, or otherwise deal with the property as they deem in the best
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interests of the Company. In connection with management of the Company, Merrill and Carla
agree that they will manage the same in a manner similar to prior management practices followed
by such individuals, and further agree that they will not directly or indirectly pay themselves any
compensation for services rendered to the Company, other than on the same basis they would
reasonably otherwise pay to a third party to render any services to the Company.
4.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Company, Merrill and Carla agree that, absent

the prior written consent of Dale upon full disclosure of the relevant facts:
a.

The Company shall not engage in any business other than the development

of the Property and activities reasonably related thereto.
b.

The Company shall not enter, transfer or encumber any of its assets except

in exchange for a reasonably equivalent value.
c.

Merrill, Carla and/or the Company shall not enter into any transaction,

contract or agreement that treats or affects the disputed 25% interest adversely and
differently than the other members' interests. By way of example, Merrill, Carla and/or
the Company shall not admit a new member to the Company or cause the Company to
transfer any of its assets in exchange for any compensation or consideration paid directly
or indirectly to Merrill and/or Carla that is not proportionately attributed to the disputed
25% interest.
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5.

The Company may distribute profits or other cash to its members. In such event,

distribution of profits or other cash shall be distributed as follows:
a.

50% to Martin W. Merrill

b.

25% to Carla K.Parker

c.

25% to an interest bearing escrow account, in trust, for Dale S. Parker and

Carla K. Parker, pending a final decision of the divorce court determination of the
ownership interests in the Company (other than is owned by Merrill). In the event such
an escrow account is to be established, Dale and Carla agree to work out, in good faith,
the exact details of such account. The purpose of the account is to establish funds to be
available in the event Dale is subsequently determined by the divorce court to own or is
awarded any percentage interest in the Company.
i.

In the event such an escrow account is subsequently established, it

shall remain in effect until further stipulation of Dale and Carla, or subsequent
Order of a court of competent jurisdiction over such parties.
ii.

Any interest earned on such escrow account shall follow the

principal thereof in any percentage in which the principal is ultimately distributed.
d.

The foregoing provisions shall not apply to distributions made by the

Company as the return of capital to Merrill and Carla, and distributions of capital may be
made to Carla on account of the entire fifty percent (50%) interest held in her name.
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However, Carla agrees that any such distributions on account of the disputed 25% interest
shall be taken into account in the event the court in their pending divorce action makes
some order relating to redistribution or re-division of the twenty five percent (25%)
interest, and shall reduce any amount Dale would otherwise be required to pay to Carla in
connection with such redistribution or re-division.
6.

In the event the divorce or appellate court subsequently determines that Dale has

or is awarded any ownership interest in the Company, Dale and Carla also acknowledge that an
adjustment will need to be made to accurately reimburse Carla for funds in the amount of
$57,615 previously paid or awarded to Dale under the divorce court Order and pertaining to this
asset. Also, in the event of such determination, all parties acknowledge that Dale will be entitled
to full access to the Company books and records in order to conduct an accounting thereof.
7.

Plaintiff Dale S. Parker and Defendant Martin W. Merrill hereby mutually release

and discharge each other from all liability, damage, claims, or obligations currently existing
between the parties, including but not limited to those causes of action raised in the Complaint in
the above-entitled matter.
8.

Plaintiff Dale S. Parker and Defendant Carla S. Parker hereby mutually release

and discharge each other from all liability, damage, claims or obligation arising from or incurred
pursuant to the causes of action raised in the Complaint in the above-entitled matter, reserving
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however, all claims associated with ownership of the Company which have been or may hereafter
be raised in the pending divorce action.
9.

For the foregoing reasons, the parties hereto stipulate and agree that the above-

entitled action is hereby resolved in its entirety, that the same has been fully settled and may be
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs and fees associated herewith.
10.

Dale agrees to immediately record a Release of Lis Pendens to remove any

previously recorded Lis Pendens filed against the Property.
DATED this ^

day of May, 1998.
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Approved:

Bryce
er
Attorney for Plaintiff Dale S. Parker

J.

i

JBruce J. Nelson
Attorney for Defendants Martin W. Merrill
and Murray Parkway Associates, L.C.

A

^^^£^Q^

Cameror S. Denning
Attorney for Defendant Carla K. Parker

bjn\mcrrill\parker\Stip.plc
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Bruce J. Nelson (2380)
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Defendants Murray Parkway Associates
and Martin W. Merrill

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DALE S. PARKER,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 970904981 CM

vs.
MURRAY PARKWAY ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Liability Company; CARLA
K. PARKER, an individual; and MARTIN
W. MERRILL, an individual,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Pursuant to joint motion of all parties hereto, and pursuant to Stipulation for Settlement
executed by all parties and counsel of record, and the Court being thereby fully advised in the
presmies and good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is hereby dismissed with
prejudice, each party to bear their own costs and fees therein.
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The parties are ordered to abide by and complete the terms of the Stipulation of
Settlement previously executed by the parties and filed with the Court.
DATED this S

day of July, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

William B. Bohling
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

M

XZS&r^

Jruce J. Nelson, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants Murray
Parkway Associates and Martin W. Merrill

Bryce ETRanzer,
Attorneys for Plaintiff Dale Parker

JL

^IrPL^C*!

Cameron S. Denning, Esq.
(p*
Attorneys for Defendant Carta K. Parker

bjn\memll\p«rker\OrderDijmiss2.ple

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

